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Within the framework  of intrahousehold bargaining, it is argued
that (1) targeting of transfers to disadvantaged members of the
household is important, (2) structural adjustment that favors
cash crops over food crops may end up worsening intrahouse-
hold inequality, and (3) as households become better-off, in-
trahousehold inequality may first increase and then decrease (in
other words, there may exist a Kuznets curve for intrahousehold
inequality).
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In many parts of the world, resources within a  found that an intrahousehold bargaining view
household are apparently not distributed accord-  (more than a household welfare maximization
ing to need.  perspective) tends to support targeting to disad-
vantaged members of the household, because of
Using a model of intrahousehold bargaining,  bargaining power effects.
Haddad and Kanbur first try to answer the
question:  As households become better-off,  The bargaining framework also gives
does intrahousehold,  increase or decrease?  This  support for the concem that some *  'Oservers  have
is the household-level counterpart to a classic  expressed about the impact of strucLural  adjust-
question Kuznets (1955) posed at the level of the  ment on intra-household inequality.  When cash
economy as a whole. They find that under  crops are predominantly under male control and
certain conditions intrahousehold inequality first  food crops are primarily a female preserve,
increases and then decreases, in other words, a  improving the relative price of cash crops can
Kuznets-type "inverse-U" curve.  worsen intrahousehold inequality.
The debate on intrahousehold inequality is  According to Haddad and Kanbur, the
entwined with policy questions about the  policy implications of applying intrahousehold
efficacy of targeting individual disadvantaged  bargaining theory to social policy questions are
members of a household, as opposed to poor  important enought that this work should con-
households in general. Haddad and Kanbur  tinue at an accelerated pace.
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The comfortable  (and perhaps  comforting)  assumpdon  of the unitary  household  has
come under increasing  attack  in recent years. In many  parts of the world,  it would  appear
that resources  within a household  are not distributed  in proportion  to need (for a recent
survey, see Behrman,  1989). There appears  to be sufficient  intra-household  inequality  to
throw out standard  estimates  of overall  inequality  by an order of 30 to 40 percent (Haddad
and Kanbur, 1989a). While the evidence  is by no means uniform  (see Deaton, 1989),  there is
enough of it to warrant  attempts  at an analysis  of the phenomenon  of intra-household
inequality.
Many authors have adopted the framework  of a household  maximizing  a modified
Udtlitarian  Welfare  Function  with a distribution  of weights  on different  individual  utlities
(e.g. Behrma., 1988). Others have taken an explicit bargaining  approach,  relying on
nodifications of two person cooperative  bargaining  theory (e.g., Manser  and Brown, 1980).
This latter approach  has been criticized  by some (e.g, Ulph, 1988)  for failing to specify
rational behaviour  in the event of a breakdown  iP.  bargaining,  while others have pointed  out
the difficulties  of distinguishing  empirically  between  the two approaches  of household  welfare
maximization  and cooperative  bargaining. In this context, the approach  of non-cooperative
bargaining  seems  a fruitful avenue  to be explored.
The literature  has attempted  to identify  several  determinants  of intra-household
allocatiod  of resources  and its inequality. However,  in this paper our focus is on scale
effects. As households  become  better  off (in a sense still to be made precise)  does intra-
household  inequality  increase  or decrease? It will be recognized  at once that this is, in many
ways, the micro counterpart  to a classic  question  posed by Kuznets  (1955) at the level of an
economy  as a whole. Kuznets  directed  our attention  to the issue of whether  inequality
increases  or decreases  as the economy  grows. A vast literature  has grown up around this
issue. The policy  relevance  of the question  is clear when we consider the "trickle  down"
hypothesis  and its critics. The latter argued  that if growth  is accompanied  by increased
1inequality,  the benefits  of growth  may in fact not trickle  down at all.
There is an analogous  reason as to why we should be interested  in possible"Kuznets
effects" at the very micro level of intra-household  allocations. As Sen (1984) notes, "The
food consumption  of a person depends,  among  other things,  on (1) the power of the family to
command  food, and (2) the division  of food within the family." Clearly,  the same point
applies to resources  in general. But if there is a systematic  relationship  between  the total
resources available  to a household  and its distribution  within the household,  then it needs to
be investigated,  so that policy  can be informed  as to if and how any increase  in total
household  resources  wil in fact "trickle  down" to individuals  within the household.
Our object in this paper is to begin an inquiry  into Kuznets  effects at the intra-household
level within the framework  of bargaining. Section 2 lays out the basic theory of scale effects
on inequality  in the context of simple  Nash Bargaining  and Non-Cooperative  Bargaining.
Section 3 uses these results  to trace out the behavior  of inequality  as a household  becomes
better off.  Section  4 presents  further  applications  of the framework,  to two recent policy
conceriis. Seciion 5 concludes  the paper.
2.  Bargaining.  Ineaualitv  and Scale Effects
2.1 Two-Person  Nash Bargaining
Consider  a two person household  that has to divide a cake of size X.  Let the proposed
division  be X,  + X2 to the two individuals. Clearly,  it is natural  to suppose  that
(1)  XI  +  X2 - X
But which of the several  combinations  of X,  + X2  Will actually arise? In his classic paper,
Nash (1950) axiomatized  an appealingly  simple  answer  to this quesdon (see Friedman, 1986,
2for a modem treatment). If s, and s 2 are the fall back positions  the two individuals  have
access to in the absence  of the bargain  (with  s,+s2 cX,  so that bargaining  is worthwhile)  then
the outcome  of the bargain  should  depend  on the relative values  ofs, and s2, with the simple
intuition that the better is an individual's  fall back option,  the better should  be his bargaining
outcome. Nash's axioms  lead to a soludon to the bargaining  problem which  can be shown to
be a solution  to the following  problem:
Max  (X 1 - sI)(x2 - Sd
(2)  XlX2
s  * t  XI + X2  -X
The solution  is easily shown  to be:
)1 - . (S1 - S,)  +  2X
(3)22
X 2 - (S2  - S)  +  2X
More complicated  structures  can be built on to this simple  framework. For example, some
writers intrduce a "bargaining  strength"  parameter,  a, which modifies  (2) as follows
Max  (XI  - S)(Y 2 - S2)
X,.X 2
S  * t  -XI  +  X2 - X
However,  for our purposes  (2) and (3) will suffice. As can be seen from (3), any
deviation  from equal shares  is explained  by the difference  in the "threat points" s, and s2.
Quite simply,  the larger the difference,  the greater the inequality. Without  loss of genemality,
suppose  s, > s2. Then an obvio  measure  of inequality  in this two person world is the
deviation,  from half, of the better  off individual's share  of the cake.
3(4)  I  Xl  1  _1  l  - s2
X  22  X
Equadon (4) provides  a basic insight  into the impact  of scale effects  on the inequality
of a distribution  arising  out of Nash bargaining.
(5)  dbl  - d&(s  - 2) -dnX
As scale increases  then, ceteris  paribus,  inequality  faUs. For given values of threat points,  as
the size of the cake grows bargaining  itself becomes  less important  and the allocation  tends to
equal shares. In general,  of course, the threat  points will also change and our task is to
model the relative  strengths  of these two forces. This task is taken up in Section 3.
2.2  Non-Coom,rative  Baraaininr
Nash's use of the threat points, motivated  as "outside  options"  available  to the two
players, has been  criticized. Suppose,  for example,  that although  s, and s2 are different,  they
are each of them less than *x. Consider  a candidate  allocation  of 4x to each of the two
players. Then a threat from individual  1 to disrupt  the bargaining  process  unless allocation
(3) is agreed to is an empty threat  It is not credible  since without  the bargain  individual I
wil have sl, which is less than the current candidate  allocation  of 4x.
Moreover,  some of the motivation  for the Nash solution  is given in terms of the
individual  with the larger security  level being able to "hold  out" for longer untl a bargain  is
struck. But such an intertemporal  waiting  process  should be made explicit. Recently
Rubinstein  (1982) has put forward a framework  of two-person  bargaining  in an intertemporal
framework  that can be used to advantage  in assessing  the role of iie  "outside  options"  s, and
s2 in determining  the outcome  of the bargaining  process. Sutton (1986)  provides  a good
discussion  of the "outside  option principle,"  and we rely on his exposition.
4Consider the following  game. At the start, one of the players,  say Player 1, proposes  a
division of the cake: XI  and X-X 1. Player 2 can (i) accept this offer, in which  case  .he  game
ends; (ii) reject the offer but make a counter-offer  X2 and X-x2;  (iii) reject the offer and
terninate the bargaining  process by taking  up his outside  option,  s2. If player 2 chooses  (ii)
and makes a counteroffer,  then Player 1 faces the.  same three categories  of choices, and so on.
We suppose  the individuals  are infinitely  livefd  and have  the same discount  rate.  We can also
make the time period between  offer and cciater-offer infinitesimally  small in order to remove
any "first player" advantage  that accrues  to Player 1.  Following  Rubinstein  (1982)  and Sutton
(1986), it can be shown that this non-cooperative  bargaining  game has a Perfect  Equilibrium
with the following  allocations:
s1 <  2X; s2 <  2  2
(6)  X2  1
s1 2XX;s 2 <  2X  X  -al
X2 - X  - SI
Notice that we are still assuming  that s, + s 2 < X, so that there are gains from reaching  a
bargain,  and that s, >  s2 (without  loss of generality).
The intuitive argument  behind  (6) is straightforward.  If s, exceeds ;x, then Player 2
needs to offer Player 1 at least s, to keep him in the game. There is no point offering more
since by offering  s, (plus "e") he could keep him in the game. On the other hand, Player 1
demanding  more than s, does not pose a credible  threat, since his outside  option is equal to
his gain from the g.  -.  If, on the other hand, s, is less than iX, so that s. is also less than
*x.  (recall that s, > s2), then these  outside options  do not pose a credible threat to the
5allocation  XI  = ;w, X2  = ;ox. We thus atrive at (6) as the only equilibrium  allocation  outcome
of the bargaining  process.
With this allocation,  the inequality  measure  I is as follows:
I  Xl  1  ~IX  X <;  2s, (7)  X 
;  X  k 2s 1
Thus as X increases  from s, + s2 (the minimum  value necessary  for the bargaining  to be
worthwhile  to both parties),  with given values of s, and s2, the inequality  measure  falls to
zero tll  X reaches 2s,.  After that it stays at zero.
f8?  a1~~~~db  - A  |  ''  - (8)  dll  []  dr 1-lX
Equatiou  8 shows us once again the balance  between "scale  effects" as reflected  in X and
"bargaining  strength  effects"  as reflected  in s,.  The basic insight  is that scale effects tend to
lead to lower inequality. The question  is whether  they dominate  the bargaining  strength
effects. For this we need a specific  model,  and the next section  attends to this task.
3  Is There an Intra-Household  Kuznets  Curve?
We suppose  a household  of two agents,  each of whom  has access to a production
function  ffn;O),  where n is a parameter  specific  to eash individual,  taking on values n, and n2,
and 9 is a parameter  common  to the household. We suppose  that
(9)  f  >O;fe  >O
6The difference  'i  n 1 and n2 is the cause of asymmetry  and inequality. Without  loss of
generality,  we assume  n, > n2. This can be interpreted  as differences  in ability,  access to
different  sized plots of land, etc.  The parameter  0 is interpreted  as a scale variable  that
improves  production  for both agents: improvement  in technology  (e.g. the high yielding
varieties  of the Green Revolution),  irrigation,  general  wage  rates (where n is interpreted  as
ability)  etc.
We assume that
(10)  An, ; 6)  -An 2; 6)  <  An, + n2;  6)
Hence,  there are gains from cooperation. BLt how will these gains be divided? If we
suppose  that in the absence  of cooperation  each individual  has the fall back option of
operating  his own production  function,  then in terms of the terminology  of the previous
sections  we have
S,  - An, ; 6)
X  - An,  +  n2;  6)
In the Nash bargaining  model  the measure of inequality  becomes
(12)  I.  1  An,;  e) -An2 :)
2  An,  + n2 ; 6)
while in the Rubinstein model it is
(13)  IA  - |  An,  + n2*)  I  ;An,  + n2;  0)  C  2f  (Al;) (13)  "ix  An  +n2;  0)  2
f  ;AnI  +  n;  6) 2 2f(n1 ; 6)
7We are now in a position  to investigate  how inequality  beham  *s  as a function  of the
scale effects parameter,  0 for different  types of production  funcdons. Consider  first of all the
multiplicadvely  separable  form
(14)  in;  6) - g(8)h(n)
Using this in (12) and (13) we get
(15)  I'  h(rs; -n
'N  2  h(n1+ n)
and
hQui)  _1  fi2  Q~
(16)  h(n  2  - 2  tf  h(n, +  2  c  2n)
0  if  h(n, 1 + n2)  2h("l)
Notice,  therefore,  that if output is multiolicatvelv  separable  in 0 and n. then scale has no
effect on inualitv  in either of the two barninini  models.
Consider  now the case where output  is additively  separable  in 0 and n:
(17)  J(n;  0) - g(e) + h(n)
In this case, again substituting  in (12) and (13), we get
8(18)  1  h(n,) - A"%)
2  h(n, +  n2) + @(e)
(19)  ij7  - ()  ;  h(n1+ n2) - 2h(n)  < g(e)
; h(n,  + n2) - 2h(nl)  2 g(Q)
Notice  first of all that for the produtdon function  (17), condition  (10) requires  that h,. > 0.
For low eiough values of 0 there are gains  to cooperation. As 0 increases  the size of the
cake increases,  but so does the fall back option to each individual. However,  as (18) shows,
since the increments  are idendcal  for each individual  they cancel each other out in their
effects  on threat points. What is left is the scale effect, so that inequality  decreases  with 0.
Once 0 becomes  so large that bargaining  is no longer worthwhile,  each individual  sticks to
his fall back option and inequality  is given by
IN - ~K(n 1) + g(e)g  h  hi-2
1N  - h(n1) + h(n1) + h(Q) + 2g(8)  8  - - h2
where h12 = h(n, + n2)  ; h, = h(n1) ; h2 = h(n2). Thus inequality  continues  to decline  as 0
increases. Figure 1 depicts  IN  as a function  of g.
The story in the non-cooperadve  game is quite different. While there are gains to
cooperation,  for small 0 the fall back options are so small relative to equal division  of
cooperative  output that the latter is indeed the equilibrium  outcome. Once 0 becomes  so
large that the fall back option of individual  1 exceeds half the cooperative  output, then he
begins to get exacdy his fall back opdon. But each increase  in 0 adds proportionately  more
to his fall back option than to the cooperative  output so that, as can be seen by differentiating
the first part of (19), inequality  increases. When 0 is so large that, g > h,2-h,-h 2 ooperation
ceases to be valuable  and individuals  revert to their own devices. Then inequality  is given by
9h(n,) +g(O)ge  h  h  2
h(n,) + h(n2)  + 2g(e);8)  h
and this declines  with 0.  Thus we get Figure  2, where inequality  first increases  and then
decreases  as the household  gets better  off--the  Kuznets  "inverse-U"  relation!
The aoove illustrations  take the case where  cooperation  is valuable  at low values of 0.
Let us r.ow  consider  the opposite  case, where  cooperation  only becomes  valuable  at high
levels of productivity. Suppose:
(20)  An  ; 0) - al
Now cooperation  is not valuable  till e  exceeds O*,  where
(21)  cale  + eA  - c>'  "
While  cooperation  does not take place, inequality  is simply:
_ _  _  _  _  I XR - IN '  - 2;  e 5 e,
It can be checked  that this increases  with 9.  Beyond e*,  the two bargaining  models give
different 3llocations,  leading to inequalities:
(22)
2  c  &A
10(23)  2  n2
Na
O  ;  e  2b-
The shapes  of IN  and TR as functions  of 0 are depicted  in Figures 3 and 4.  We see that in
both cases as the household  becomes  better  off inequality  first increases  and then decreases--
the Kuznets  inverse-U  once again.
Thus, while in general there is no guarantee  that the opposing  forces of scale effects
and bargaining  strength  effects will go together  to produce  an inverse-U  shape, we have
demonstrated  cases where  there is indeed a Kuznets  curve at the micro level of intra-
household  inequality. It remains for empirical  work to test this prediction  with actual data.
4.  Further ADolicatons  of the Framework
4.1  Intra-Household  Targetina
The debate on intra-household  inequality  is entwined  with the policy question  of the
efficacy  of targeting  individual,  disadvantaged,  members  of a household. These concerns  are
reflected  in the discussions  in developed  countries  on whether  child benefit should be paid
through  the father's pay cheque, or whether  it should  be an allowance  that the mother  picks
up at a government  office. They are also reflected  in the discussions  in developing  countries
on the efficacy  of instituting  special supplementary  feed.ng  programs  for mothers and
children. One argument  is that this is the best way of making  sure that some nourishment
does indeed  reach the disadvantaged  within a household. Another  argument  is that this is a
naive view of intra-household  allocation-might  there not be a reduction  in the nourishment
provided within  the household  to those who go to the supplementary  feeding  statior?  A
counter to this is that so long as the substitution  is not one for one, then at least part of the
11objective  will Wyve  been achieved.
Some of these questions  can be addressed  in the simple  framework  we have
developed. We think of a general  resource  transfer  problem  where the choice is between
targeting  the transfer  to the disadvantaged  within a household,  and not doing so.  In the latter
case, we may suppose  that resources  are divided  equally  between the two individuals  in our
model.
There are several ways in which  we can model  the impact  of transfers  on the
bargaining  structure. First of all, we can suppose  that these transfers  do not alter the security
levels of the two players  in the game-they are merely  an addition  to the overall size of the
cake. In this case, in the Nash bargaining  model  there will be equal division  of the total
increment  to household  resources  (see eq. 3), no matter how and to whom the increment  is
targeted. In the non-cooperative  bargaining  model,  however,  the story can be very different,
provided  the increment  is not so large as to not change the structure  of the solution  (6). If
there was already equal division  (because  the two outside  options were each less than one
half of the total cooperative  resource),  then this will continue  and the increment  will also be
divided  equally,  as in the Nash model. But if the dominant  player's outside  option exceeds
one half of the total cooperative  resource,  so that the solution  entails this player getting
exactly  his outside option,  then the entire increment  will go to the disadvantaged  player, even
though we assume that the transfers  do not change  outside  options.
Now suppose  that the transfers  are indeed  incorporated  into outside options and
increase them one for one.  With Nash bargaining,  the increment  now stays with whoever
gets it--there  is a clear benefit  to targeing the transfer  to the disadvantaged  player (assuming
that the object is to increase  his consumpdlon).  The same  is true in the non-coopeative
bargaining  model. If the transfer  is to thpdominant  player  and this increases  his outside
option one for one, the resulting  allocation  entails him getting all the surplus. If the transfer
is not to the dominant  player  then the disadvantaged  keeps  all the transfer.
12Thus bargaining  models  tend to strengthen  the argument  in favour of targeting
resource  transfers  to disadvantaged  members  within  an additional  household. Unlike
household  welfare  maximization  models,  where the transfer is seen as an additional  household
resource  to be distributed  according  to the rules of the household  welfare  function,  if we view
the transfer  to a specific  person  as influencing  his bargaining  power,  then there is a targeting
gain to making sure that the transfer  is indeed  to the disadvantaged  person.
4.2  Structural  Adjustment  and Intra-Household  Inegualitv
During the 1980s,  many  developing  countries,  particularly  those in Africa,  have
undergone  programs  of "structural  adjustment."  Among the important  policy  changes  these
programs  entail is the encouragement  of cash crop production  for export  This is done
through  increasing  the producer  price of these  crops (such as cocoa or coffee). In many  of
these countries  certain food crops (eg root corps like cassava)  are not internationally  traded,
and part of the general adjustment  is to reduce  the price of non-trade  goods  relative to traded
goods.
These relative  price changes,  driven though  they are by macroeconomic  considerations,
have significant  distributional  implications. A literature  has begun to develop around  these
questions  (eg Kanbur, 1987) but this has ignored  intra-household  inequality. At the same
time, however,  those familiar vith the structure  and division  of responsibilites within African
agricultural  households  have pointed  to the fact that in these  households  cash crops are
primarily  a male preserve. Males tend to control  the revenue from cash crops and dispose  of
them as they wish. At the same time,  the "food  crop plot" is the woman's responsibility  and
she uses the output from this to feed the family  and the revenue  from market sales of food to
attend to children's needs. In this context,  it has been argued  by some that the price changes
in favor of cash crops may end up worsening  intra-household  inequality.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop  an adequate  and satisfactory  model of
African  agricultural  structure. What we can do is to see what light the framework  developed
13in this paper can shed on structural  adjustment  and intra-household  inequality. In order to do
this we suppose,  in our two-person  household,  that the man's fall back option is the cash crop
plot while the woman's fall back  option is the food crop plot.  While  cooperation  can
increase the total value of household  income,  division  of the fruits  of cooperation  is with
respect to the fall back options.
We use the following  notation  with food as the numeraire:
p  - price of cash crop relative to food
Cl  - cash crop output without cooperation
C  - cash crop output with cooperation
F2 - food output without  cooperation
F  - food output with cooperation
We need to assume that
F 2 +  I cF+PC
so that cooperation  is worthwhile. We also assume
PCI > F2
so that individual  1 (the man, growing  the cash crop) is the dominant  bargainer.
We can now lay out the allocations  in the two bargaininig  models  and trace through  the
impact  of relative  price changes. Starting  with the Nash bargain:
For the non-cooperative  bargain,  we assume  that
PC 1 '  2(F  +  pC)
2
14Xi  - p1CI - F;;  +  1  (F+pCQ
(24)  XN  - 1 (F 2 - pCQ) + 2(F  + pC)
IN  1  pC 1 - F2
2  F  +pC
so that player 1 receives  his outside  option always. In this case:
sj'  -pC1 R
(25)  X2  - F +  pC - PC4
Is  PC 1 ,  1
F +pC  2
Consider  now the impact  of an increase  in p.  For the Nash bargain:
dXN
d2  1 (C  - C )  >  0  V  C  > Cl
(26)  dp  2
dIN  I  FC,  + F2C >  0
dp  2  [F + pCJ 2
Thus, provided  cooperative  cash crop output exceeds  non-cooperative  cash crop output (a
plausible  assumption),  we get that the disadvantaged  party benefits. However,  the advantaged
party benefits even more-leading to an increase  in inequality. In the Rubinstein  non-
cooperative  bargaining  model  we have:
Thus in this model  too, intra-household  inequality  increases,  but not at the expense  of actual
immiserization  of the disadvantaged  member  of the household.
15dx A2  _fC  'Cl
(27)  dp
djp  [F . pCJ 2
5.  Conclusion
The object of this paper has been to investigate  the implications  of intra-household
bargaining  models  for the behaviour  of intra-household  inequality  as a function  of total
household  resources. We find theoretical  support  for a Kuznets  inverse-U  curve at the micro
level--under  certain  conditions,  a general  imnprovement  in household  resources  leads to first an
increase and then a decrease  in intra-household  inequality. An empirical  investigation  of such
a relationship  is to be found in Haddad  and Kanbur  (1989b). In the latter part of the paper
we investigated  the implications  of intra-household  bargaining  models  for two questions  that
are prominent  in the policy  debate. We found that as compared  to household  welfare
maximization  models,  bargaining  models  tend to lead to a greater  emphasis  on targeting to
disadvantaged  members  of a household. Secondly,  we found support  for the worry some
commentators  have expressed  concerning  the impact  of structUral  adjustment  an intra-
household  inequality. In a situation  where the male fal back option is cash crops and the
female  fall back option is food crops, an improvement  in the relative  price of the former  can,
through  the bargaining  allocation,  worsen  intra-household  inequality. However,  this does not
mean an immiserization  of the disadvantaged  member--both  benefit,  but one benefits more
than the other.
It should be clear that the analysis  in this paper represents  but a small part of the
systematic  application  of bargaining  theory to the emerging  questions  of intra-household
allocation  in developing  countries. Much more theoretical and empirical  work remains to be
done, and the policy  implications  are important  enough that this work should  continue  at an
accelerated  pace.
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